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market-based instruments have not been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy 
yet. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation in the past decade the Public 
Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives 
for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy instead of command-
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1. Introduction  
 
“A survey of 40 leading US economists in 1998 found that that there is little agreement 
among them as to which of thirteen national tax and regulatory reforms are desirable public 
policies, with the exception that all support a proposed 25¢ per gallon fuel tax increase.” 
Wachs (2003) 
 
At least since the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC was released in 2007, the need 
for ambitious global action to combat climate change is more pressing than it ever was. 
Nevertheless, the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, held in December 2009, 
failed to reach its main objective: a legally binding agreement on an amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol that would enable a second commitment period to follow the end of the first 
commitment period in 2012. The so called Copenhagen Accord of 18 December 2009 was 
neither adopted nor endorsed by the Conference of the Parties, which simply took note of it. 
Hence uncertainty about the future of the global climate regime as designed by the Kyoto-
Protocol is growing. The greenhouse gas reduction targets laid down in the Kyoto-Protocol 
are binding only until 2012 and the prospects of setting legally binding targets beyond that 
date are hard to assess.  
As an important player in the Kyoto process, the EU decided to base its climate policy on 
using market-based instruments in environmental policy. Especially the adoption of Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003, establishing 
a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading (EU-ETS) within the Community 
and amending Council Directive 96/61 EC, has affirmed this major shift in the way 
environmental policy is implemented and publicly perceived. Due to its amendment by 
Directive 2008/101/EC, the EU emission trading system (EU-ETS) was even extended by 
including aviation activities. The latest amendment by Directive 2009/29/EC finally set the 
course for the time beyond the current Kyoto period, originally based on the assumption that 
a global and comprehensive post-2012 agreement would be concluded in due time. 
But also other instruments, like the car scrapping premium introduced during the recent 
economic recession in various countries or the discussion about introducing a CO2 tax in 
some major European countries, have created more public - and especially political –
awareness of the importance of choosing adequate instruments for environmental policy (see 
Unalan and Cowell (2009) for an overview of environmental governance in the European 
Union). 
One of the main reasons for this wider acceptance is certainly climate change, and 
particularly the formal statement of IPCC (2007) that “most of the observed increases in 
globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed 
increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations”, clarifying that human 
greenhouse gas emissions are (almost certainly) responsible for climate change. In 
consequence, the Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen (COP-15) agreed to stabilize 4 
 
global warming at an additional 2 degrees (despite the absence of binding commitments) and 
the European Union decided to adapt its CO2 emissions to reach the 2 degree target. 
Furthermore, in 2008, the EU climate and energy package was presented, specifying 1) a 
reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions of at least 20% below 1990 levels, 2) a 20% 
share of EU energy consumption to come from renewable resources and 3) a 20% reduction 
in primary energy use to be achieved by improving energy efficiency (known as 20-20-20 
targets, see European Commission (2008b) for details). 
Global agreements like the Kyoto protocol and multi-national agreements like the EU-ETS 
show a basic willingness on the part of governments all over the world to commit themselves 
to environmentally friendly policies. But this willingness is seemingly not combined with the 
use of effective and efficient instruments, even though the importance of incorporating 
environmental goals in the policy of industrialized countries is undisputed in comparison to 
other purely economic goals like full employment (for a discussion and literature about the 
effectiveness of European environmental policy see Newig and Fritsch (2009)). This can 
especially be stated for the Kyoto agreement and for the EU-ETS, neither of which turn out to 
be successful, due to their design. They rather seem to be motivated by individual choices 
that differ between countries and are subject to and defined by intra-country strategies (see 
i.e. Bailey and Rupp (2005)). Out of the EU-27 countries that ratified the Kyoto protocol, only 
16 countries have reduced their CO2 emissions, none of them substantially (see 
Schepelmann et al. (2009)). Whether any country has actually decreased CO2 emissions due 
to its facilities being part of the EU-ETS is still subject to discussion (see Sandoff and Schaad 
(2009)). The alleged inefficiency of the overall system has eventually led to its redesign; the 
result will be put to work in the next trading period 2013 to 2020. Furthermore, whether the 
instruments now in use were introduced for reasons of environmental protection or as a way 
to raise additional governmental revenues is disputable as well (see e.g. Svendsen et al. 
(2001) for a discussion of the effectiveness of CO2 taxation in the OECD). 
The aim of our paper is to apply the Public Choice approach in order to discuss why the 
use of market-based instruments in environmental policy is still limited and why those 
instruments that are already in place do not bring about the desired environmental results. 
Earlier papers tackled a similar issue, such as Kirchgässner and Schneider (2002), 
Schneider and Volkert (1999) and Schneider and Weck-Hannemann (2005). In all these 
papers the basic Public Choice model is presented and not the more recent empirical and 
theoretical developments from 2003 on. In our paper we focus on the latest developments 
and show that in spite of some environmental policy measures (like the EU-ETS) little has 
been achieved. 
In accordance with Public Choice theory we do not treat the state as a uniform body but 
discuss the characteristics and main interests in environmental policy of the five groups of 
economic agents - voters, politicians, administrators, producers and interest groups - plus 
their interactions.  5 
 
We assume utility-maximizing or selfish behavior for all five groups involved, but also 
discuss literature findings on allowing for altruistic, pro-social and pro-environmental attitudes 
when assessing economic agents’ behavior.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the characteristics of market-based 
and command-and-control instruments and takes a closer look at the EU-ETS and 
environmental taxes. In section 3 we discuss the Public Choice approach to environmental 
policy and analyze the motives of voters, politicians, producers, interest groups and public 
administrators. Section 4 winds up our discussion. 
 
2. Choosing an instrument: market-based versus command-and-control 
 
Basically, three types of market-based instruments are considered in the literature: 
charges and taxes, subsidies, and tradeable permits. In Smith et al. (1997) deposit-refund 
systems are listed as a fourth instrument, while Stavins (2003a) ranks deposit-refund 
systems among pollution charges and lists market friction reductions (market creation, 
liability rules, information programs) as a fourth type of instrument instead.  
For the scope of this paper, we consider market-based instruments that encourage 
behavior through price signals rather than through explicit directives. They correct prices in 
distorted markets, existing as well as evolving ones, and internalize environmental 
externalities at the lowest overall cost to society. Incentives are formulated in such a way that 
the greatest reductions can be realized by those economic agents with the lowest costs (see 
Stavins (2003a) and Santos et al. (2006)).  
In contrast to market-based instruments are command-and-control instruments that 
‘dictate’ a certain behavior for all economic agents or for a group of agents defined by 
specific characteristics. The prescribed behavior is mandatory and deviations are subject to 
punishment.  
Command-and-control mechanisms are criticized for being inflexible as they set uniform 
standards for economic agents, regardless of the individual costs involved (see Stavins 
(2003a)). Dresner et al. (2006) give a set of reasons for the continued use of command-and-
control instruments. They argue that command-and-control instruments are already familiar 
and that there is a comfort factor involved in knowing that every facility is controlled. 
Furthermore, they point at the cultural dimension of respecting and obeying the law, which is 
more apparent under a regulatory regime.  
If market-based instruments are superior to command-and-control mechanism from a 
theoretical point of view, the question why there is an undersupply of them arises. 
Kirchgässner and Schneider (2002) discuss three general arguments against the wider use 
of market-based instruments:  6 
 
Firstly, they argue that there are objections to the basic concept of the neoclassical model 
as well as the theory of homo economicus. Secondly, they point to arguments that market-
based instruments might crowd out environmental ethics, which are essential in other policy 
areas. This argument has been analyzed in a relatively new cross-disciplinary field of 
economic research that combines insights from economics and psychology. Frey and Stutzer 
(2007) argue that an environmental policy via command-and-control measures undermines 
environmental morale because under a regulatory regime individuals’ self-determination is 
reduced and replaced by prescriptions. Environmental morale and motivation are important: 
they increase the demand for a clean environment or environmentally friendly private goods 
and products, which according to Frey and Stutzer (2007) is i.e. manifested in hedonic 
market studies on the housing and labor markets.  
Environmental morale can also help to overcome the free-rider problem in public good 
provision. While this reduces any intrinsic environmental behavior, it also leaves consumers 
informed about the right way to behave. Whether regulations lead to the crowding out of 
environmental morale depends on their design: few, easy to understand regulations are to be 
favored so that consumers are not overly governed and violations are effectively punished. 
They reason that “a large number of complex, abstract and opaque regulations, on the other 
hand, are unlikely to improve the environment as environmental morale will be strongly 
crowded out while threatened punishments are easier to evade”. Frey and Stutzer (2007) 
furthermore find that tradeable permits crowd-out environmental morale. In the case of taxes, 
differentiations are made: with low taxes, consumers do not feel overly controlled, whereas 
the crowding-out effect is either small or could eventually become a crowding-in effect. With 
intermediate or high taxes on the other hand, crowding-out will occur. 
Of the various market-based instruments, we focus our discussion on environmental taxes 
and permit trade systems, as those two instruments are at the center of European 
environmental policy. In theory, permit trading systems and emission taxes are equally 
efficient, if the tax rate is set at a level that equals the price of the permit. But current 
developments show that in practice different problems arise in the political discussion: Why is 
the EU-ETS not as efficient as it could be? Why are environmental taxes difficult to impose 
and inefficiently designed when imposed? And finally, why are command-and-control 
measures still promoted even though their efficiency is – at least from a theoretical point of 
view – inferior to market-based instruments? 
In section 3 we will look into these questions from the point of view of the most important 
players in developed countries: voters, politicians, producers, interest groups and 
bureaucracies.  Before, we highlight the main characteristics of the EU-ETS and 





Taking into account the important status that the EU-ETS has reached in the meantime, 
and the political and economic efforts that have been put into the development and ongoing 
improvement of this instrument, its nature is worth examining. The basic concept of the EU-
ETS is a cap-and trade system. The regulator sets an emission cap, where the level of the 
cap depends on how ambitious the reduction target is. Finally, the participators in the 
emission trading market – the facilities – receive individual allocations of emission 
allowances. Practically, two questions arise from this emission trading design that have 
fundamental influence on the overall system’s efficiency: what is the cap and how are the 
emission allowances allocated? For the purpose of our analysis the second question is of 
especial importance. Basically, two types of allocation methods are possible: Permits can 
either be given out at no costs and allocated according to past emission levels 
(grandfathering) or they can be auctioned off. Within the EU-ETS the grandfathering option 
was chosen, at least for the first (2005-2007) and the second (2008-2012) trading periods, 
even though auctioning permits off is considered the superior allocation method, for which 
Goers et  al. (2010) provide four reasons: firstly, auctions are more cost-effective given 
transaction costs. Secondly, the revenue raised in an auction can be used to reduce other 
market distortions, because tradeable permits can create market entry barriers which can be 
offset if the government recycles the auction revenue by reducing preexisting distortionary 
taxes. The third argument in favor of auctioning is that greater incentives for firms to develop 
substitutes for CO2-intensive technologies are created. Finally, the (probably) substantial 
revenue that could be raised by an auctioning procedure may provide greater incentives to 
administrative agencies to monitor compliance. Anger et  al. (2008) also argue that the 
elimination of lobbying influence should be considered as a further benefit of auctioning. Yet 
another argument in favor of grandfathering is that it may buy the support of the polluting 
industries involved in the trading system due to the free initial distribution (see Anthoff and 
Hahn (2010) and Markussen and Svendsen (2005)).  
Grandfathering of permits in the EU-ETS has led to perverse economic results: due to 
extensive lobbying activities more permits than needed were allocated in the first trading 
period, which led to a vast decline in the permits price (see Goeree et  al. (2009)). 
Furthermore, large emitters charged their customers for the permits and thus received high 
windfall profits (see Goeree et al. (2009) and Benz et al. (2008)).  
It is beyond the scope of our paper to go into details on any other aspects of the EU-ETS, 
but we refer the reader to work done by Convery (2009), Ellerman and Joskow (2008) and 
Goers et al. (2010). For the sake of our discussion the most important aspect of the current 
design of the EU-ETS is that the permit allocation method is not as efficient as it could be, 
even though the superiority of auctioning over grandfathering was known ex-ante.  
 8 
 
2.2 Environmental taxes 
 
The other main market-based instruments currently in use in Europe, and the widening of 
which is intensively discussed in the European Union, are environmental taxes.  
Environmental taxation is not a new idea. As early as 1972 the OECD issued “Guiding 
Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies“ in which the 
Polluter-Pays principle was presented and the idea of internalizing external effects of 
pollution in market prizes was recommended. 
Environmental taxes are discussed as being a policy with which a double dividend could 
be realized. The double dividend hypothesis states that when taxes which cause distortions 
in one economic sector are reduced and simultaneously taxes to reduce distortions in 
another sector are introduced, overall efficiency would rise and unemployment would be 
reduced. If there is a double dividend and the implementation of incentive-oriented 
environmental tax policies is not accompanied by tax increases but by a shift in the tax 
burden, there is no longer a trade-off between fighting unemployment and environmental 
policy. There is an ever growing body of literature about the double dividend hypothesis: see 
e.g. Agnolucci (2009) for a recent overview. Patuelli et al. (2005) conducted a meta-analysis 
of 61 studies and found that an environmental tax reform is more efficient on the 
environmental side than on the economic side, but their results do not reject the double 
dividend hypothesis. Anger et al. (2010) find in their meta-regression analysis encompassing 
41 studies that employment effects are negatively affected by the stringency of 
environmental regulation. We reproduce their findings in a highly abbreviated way in Table 1 
which shows the ambiguity of outcomes in the literature.  
In the introduction we also raised the question of what motives could trigger the 
introduction of environmental taxes in the European Union. Currently discussed, and strongly 
supported by the French government, is the introduction of a CO2 tax to be levied at the 
European Union’s borders to reduce trade distortions and to safeguard the competitiveness 
of European industry relative to large Asian producers, especially China. The introduction of 
an environmental tax is mainly discussed in terms of industries’ competitiveness, not in terms 
of environmental issues. Evidence for the view that environmental taxes are introduced for 
budgetary and not for environmental reasons can be found in Ciocirlan and Yandle (2003). 
They tested their model of the political economy of policy-making using data for the OECD, 
and found that environmental taxes are set mainly with for the aims of industry 
competitiveness and increasing revenue, and therefore lack environmental effectiveness. 
Table 1 shows that for most studies we clearly see a reduction of emissions up to -17% 
versus the business-as-usual scenario, whereas the employment effect is very modest. 








effect  Study  Region 
(% vs. 
BAU)  (% vs. BAU) 
Köppl et al. (1995)  Austria  -7 0,4 
Capros et al. (1998)  European Union  -18 0,4 
Bayar (1998)  European Union  -16 1,3 
Ellingsen et al. (2000)  European Union  -14 1 
Bosello and Carraro (2001)  European Union  -14 1,3 
Hayden (1999)   European Union  -11,5 0,1 
Barker and Rosendahl (2000)  European Union  -11,5 1,1 
Barker (1998)   European Union  -10 1,2 
Welsch (1996)  European Union  -6,5 1,7 
Capros et al. (1996)  European Union  -5 0,2 
Bossier and Brechet (1995)  European Union  -4,4 0,6 
Koschel (2001)  European Union  5 0,6 
Welsch (1998)  European Union  8,5 5,4 
Buttermann and Hillebrand (1996)  Germany  -17,1 -0,7 
DIW (1994)  Germany  -17,1 1,1 
Meyer et al. (1997)  Germany  -17 3,3 
Meyer (2001)  Germany  -16,9 1,6 
Schmidt and Koschel (1999)  Germany  -15,5 0,6 
Conrad and Löschel (2002)  Germany  -13,7 0,4 
Schön et al. (1995)  Germany  -5 0 
Braun and Kitterer (2000)  Germany  -3 1,7 
Stephan et al. (2003)  Germany  -2 -0,6 
Meyer zu Himmern (1997)  Switzerland  -15,4 0,1 
Mauch et al. (1996)  Switzerland  -6,1 0,3 
Source: Anger et al. (2010), abbreviated by authors.  
 
 
2.3 Permits, taxes and command-and-control measures 
 
From sections 2.1 and 2.2 we conclude that there is an ambiguity between a) knowing about 
the superiority of market-based instruments, taxes and permit trading systems, in terms of 
efficiency, b) and the competing interests of all economic agents involved. Before turning to 
those competing interests, we discuss the instruments’ characteristics from a global point of 
view to find answers to the three questions we asked above. 
Firstly, we have to ask why command-and-control measures are still favored in 
environmental policy. Kirchgässner and Schneider (2002) identify two reasons: the high 
economic efficiency of market-based instruments, and distributional concerns.  
The first argument of high economic efficiency is based on the situation a single firm faces 
with the introduction of market-based instruments: while the economic efficiency of these 
instruments for the whole economy can be reasonably assumed, it is debatable whether the 
single firm can realize minimum costs. Felder and Schleiniger (2002) argue for example that 10 
 
if a tax design involves no refunding scheme all polluters will favor a command-and-control 
regime over taxes. But, assuming there is a refund system and emission levels are 
heterogeneous among polluters, then refunding depends on the individual polluting level of 
each facility. Uniform refunding would therefore lead to redistribution from large to small 
polluters. In consequence, smaller polluters may prefer taxes, while larger producers may 
still prefer command-and-control measures. The theory of lobbying behavior (see section 
3.3) points out that smaller well organized interest groups are relatively more successful in 
lobbying than lobbyists representing larger interest groups. In a world with a few large 
emission polluters and a large number of small polluters, there will be a marked tendency for 
the policy outcome to be a command-and-control mechanism, even if taxes or other market-
based instruments would both be more efficient and/or effective (see Svendsen et  al. 
(2001)). 
Furthermore, within a command-and-control regime there is leeway for negotiations 
between the regulating authority and the individual firm (see Oates and Portney (2003)). 
Assuming asymmetric information between the authority and the firm, the firm certainly has 
superior bargaining power. In one-on-one talks the firm can also exercise pressure by 
threatening to shed employees or to relocate. Another argument is the federal structure of 
many European countries in which legislative power is split between regional governments 
and central government. Regulating power at least partially lies with the federal states and 
their authorities, while the central government exercises tax jurisdiction. In such a case the 
familiarity between a firm and the relevant regional government is certainly greater than the 
familiarity between the firm and central government, which will also increase individual firms’ 
bargaining power. Overall, Kirchgässner and Schneider (2002) conclude that regulation will 
be less strict with a command-and-control regime than with market-based instruments.  
The second argument of Kirchgässner and Schneider (2002) is that distributional 
consequences arise under either a command-and-control regime or market-based 
instruments. We assume a firm has identical characteristics under a command-and-control 
mechanism and in a situation in which market-based instruments are used. Under a 
regulatory regime, pollution for the firm is free. With market-based instruments pollution 
comes with a cost when taxes are imposed and when permits are auctioned off, but is also 
free of costs when permits are allocated by grandfathering. Regulation would be preferred to 
market-based instruments, and grandfathered permits would be preferred to other market-
based instruments or permit allocation methods, because both exhibit an additional rent in 
comparison to taxes and auctioned permits. Grandfathering additionally creates entry 
barriers to markets, which is another benefit for existing firms (see also Stavins et al. (1997)).  
Lai (2008) furthermore argues “that imposing an emission standard will restrict output, 
which in turn will raise the price of the commodity under consideration, thereby increasing the 
profits of existing firms.” In contrast to that an emission tax would raise additional budget for 
the government, which is why firms generally prefer an emission standard to an emission tax. 
Oates and Portney (2003) point out that one reason why “the use of taxes to discourage 11 
 
polluting activities and the introduction of systems of tradeable emission allowances are now 
more than just ideas appearing in textbooks on the subject” is that the shortcomings of 
command-and-control mechanisms have become more apparent over time. For example the 
tightening of control of polluting activities gets more expensive over time, which makes it 
more worthwhile to look for alternatives (see also Rondinelli and Berry (2000) for a 
discussion of the costs of command-and-control measures in the US).  
At the beginning of section 2 we posed three questions. The first one addressed the 
notion that existing permit trade systems are not as efficient as they could be, because 
grandfathering the permits instead of auctioning them off is only the second-best solution. 
We saw from the general point of view that we took throughout this section that interest 
groups seem to have an intrinsic motivation to support grandfathering, an argument that we 
will look at in more detail in sections 3.3 and 3.4. The second question, “Why are 
environmental taxes difficult to impose and inefficiently designed when imposed?” can be 
answered either in terms of politicians’ with competing interest who want to increase 
governmental revenue or with a more specific resistance towards taxes. We will discuss 
these aspects in sections 3.1 and 3.2. The final question, why command-and-control 




3. The Public Choice approach to environmental policy 
 
We now turn to the economic agents and discuss - according to Public Choice theory - the 
motives or interests in environmental policy of voters, politicians, public administrators, 
producers and interest groups. Figure 1 shows the interdependence of all of these parties 
and that in any policy process the outcome of negotiations is one of all parties’ competing 
interests. In environmental policy, being a policy that ought to preserve the common public 
good “the environment”, these interactions are of great importance, as our analysis will show.  
 
Figure 1. The interaction of economic agents from a public choice perspective 
 
Source: developed by authors 
 
The main focus of the following Public Choice analysis is discussing the different points of 
views of all agents involved on command-and-control versus market-based instruments. But 
not only is the choice of the instrument of uttermost importance for successful environmental 
policy, also the fundamental points of view of the agents matter.  
In relation to climate change mitigation, Llewellyn (2010) discusses eight different 
intellectual positions of opponents of a stronger environmental policy.  
Firstly, he argues, that there is a group of people who generally sees no need for any 
emission reduction policy and secondly, some believe that any action comes to late anyway. 13 
 
Both arguments can – in his opinion - be overcome by establishing the credibility of the 
science (see also section 3.1 about trust and credibility issues).  
Thirdly, there is concern, that emission reductions and economic growth are incompatible. 
The next two positions he describes, target the costs of emission reductions: on the one 
hand, some argue that emission reductions are too costly and on the other hand they have to 
be borne ‘up-front’ (see section 3.1 for a discussion of price-elasticities and social discount 
rates). Furthermore, emission reduction targets are considered unrealistic by many and 
cannot be achieved due to a lack of political will. Lastly, there is no first mover advantage 
involved with imposing environmental policy. 
With these fundamental arguments in mind, we will now turn to analyzing the individual 
position of the actors involved. 14 
 
3.1 The voters 
 
Citizens’/voters’ sensitivity towards environmental issues has continuously increased 
throughout recent decades. One indicator for this is that voters attach more and more 
importance to the use of renewable energy sources. Wüstenhagen and Bilharz (2006) show 
that in Germany within the period 1984 to 2003 the public attitude towards energy sources 
has shifted notably from nuclear power to renewable energy sources (wind, solar). While in 
1984 only 17% of respondents expected wind energy to significantly contribute to Germany’s 
energy supply, in the following three decades the figure increased, to 42% in 2003. Public 
opinion analysis undertaken by the European Commission shows that 50% of European 
Citizens consider climate change a serious problem (see Table 2). In yet another survey for 
the European Commission, 97% of respondents considered environmental protection very or 
fairly important (see European Commission (2008a)).  
 
Table 2: Results of Eurobarometer survey, January/February 2009 
In your opinion, which of the following do you consider to be the most 
serious problem currently facing the world as a whole? 
Firstly? Any others? - % EU 
Rank  Problems  2008 2009 %-change 
1  Poverty, lack of food and drinking water  67% 66% -1% 
2  A major global economic downturn  24% 52% 117% 
3 Climate  change  62% 50% -19% 
4 International  terrorism  53% 42% -21% 
5 Armed  conflicts  38% 39% 3% 
Source: European Commission (2009b) 
 
But when asked about the overall most important issues for Europe at the moment, those 
surveyed put unemployment, the economic situation and crime at the top of the list, while 
environmental and energy issues did not even enter the top 10 (see Table 3) they ranked 
12th and 13th. The European Commission’s statistics raise the question where this two-
facedness among voters comes from and whether the under-provision of market-based 
instruments in developed democracies is after all still due to a lack of concern among voters, 
due to their competing interests or other factors. The literature proposes a number of 
explanations for the voters’ behavior, which we will discuss below. 
The comparatively new Happiness research literature provides evidence that 
environmental pollution negatively affects individual well-being (see Welsch (2006) and 
Welsch (2009)), which supports the view that the general public has an intrinsic motivation to 
act in an environmentally friendly way. Halla et al. (2008) analyze the relationship between 
citizens’ satisfaction with the quality and performance of the economic and political system 
they live in and environmental quality. They find that “[…] both a focus on environmental 
policy and higher environmental quality (in terms of lower emissions, in particular, of CO2, 
and less traffic) increase satisfaction with democracy in statistically and economically 15 
 
important ways.” But they also report that a rise in public environmental expenditure tends to 
decrease average satisfaction, which they interpret as a confirmation for the public good 
characteristics of environmental policy and environmental quality. Furthermore, Layton and 
Levine (2003) show empirically that the public’s willingness to pay to prevent small negative 
impacts on the ecosystem is insignificantly different from zero but significantly positive with 
larger impacts. 
 
Table 1: Results of Eurobarometer survey, October/November 2009 
What do you think are the two most important 
issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the 
moment? 
Rank  Issues  Answers in %*
1 Unemployment  51%
2 Economic  Situation  40%
3 Crime  19%
4 Rising  prices/inflation  19%
5 Healthcare  system  14%
6 Immigration  9%
7 Pensions  9%
8 Taxation  8%
9  The educational 
system  7%
10 Housing  5%
11 Terrorism  4%
12 The  environment  4%
13 Energy  3%
14  Defense/foreign 
affairs  2%
Source: European Commission (2009a), * multiple answers possible 
 
A lack of information about market-based instruments in environmental policy, especially 
energy taxes, is found in several studies (for France see Deroubaix and Leveque (2004), for 
Ireland see Clinch and Dunne (2006); for Germany see Beuermann and Santarius (2006)). 
One line of arguments in the discussion about why market-based instruments are not 
satisfactorily incorporated in environmental policies is that this lack of information on the 
voters’ side is too costly to be overcome. Understanding the complexity of environmental 
issues requires higher education, interest and time to learn, therefore acquiring information is 
subject to high opportunity costs (see also Anthoff and Hahn (2010)). But Klok et al. (2006) 
report that participants in a Danish focus group argued that “they could not accept something 
they did not understand”.  
However, Owens and Driffill (2008) argue that information about “the need for, or 
characteristics of, controversial developments has not notably delivered acquiescence on the 
part of local communities. On the contrary, it can fuel distrust […]”. If only information can 
raise acceptance for new instruments but information also triggers distrust in specific 
projects, the key target issue according to several studies is seeking trust, as voters may 
simply not trust their governments. Studies for a number of European countries show that 16 
 
voters especially either do not trust their governments to use the extra taxes responsibly or 
see no reason for any additional tax.  
In a study for Ireland, Clinch and Dunne (2006) report that voters are on the one hand 
suspicious and distrustful of their government when it comes to tax policy and on the other 
hand already feel overtaxed. Deroubaix and Leveque (2004) report that the participants in 
their French focus groups suggested “that politicians always thwart the allocation of taxes”. 
Even stronger is a study result for Denmark in which focus group participants suppose that 
environmental taxes are just another way for obtaining public revenues and that their 
environmental effects were only fake (see Klok et al. (2006)). A similar response is reported 
by Dresner et al. (2006) for the United Kingdom.  
Another aspect of this trust issue is that voters believe they alone have to bear the costs. 
This line of argument does have substance. Especially if price elasticity is low, the tax burden 
can be transferred from producers to consumers (which – in most cases – would offend the 
polluter-pays principle). But if price elasticities are high, the tax burden will be borne by 
producers as well as workers. Ghalwash (2005) reports own-price elasticities of Swedish 
households of -1.80 for an electricity tax, of -1.83 for a district heating tax and of -1.58 for an 
oil tax. Graham and Glaister (2005) report price elasticities for gasoline demand in the range 
of -0.6 and -1.0. For Spain, Romero-Jordán et al. (2010) estimated the price elasticities of 
transport fuels at -0.32 to -0.75. Finally, Brons et al. (2008) also find mean short-run and 
long-run price elasticities of −0.34 and −0.84, respectively, for demand for gasoline in a 
meta-study of 43 studies. Price elasticities for gasoline demand, for which a large body of 
literature is available, tend to undermine the fear that environmental taxes may at least partly 
be borne by voters alone (see Table 4).  
 
Table 2: Price-elasticities 
Source  Electricity 
tax 
District 
heating  Oil tax  Gasoline/ 
transport fuels 
Ghalwash (2005)   -1.8  -1.83  -1.58   
Graham and Glaister (2005)        -0.6 to -1.0 
Romero-Jordán et al. (2010)        -0.32 to -0.75 
Brons et al. (2008)        -0.34 to -0.84 
Source: see reference list 
 
When it comes to compliancy with a specific tax regime, Feld and Frey (2002) point out 
that a rationale voter would try to evade taxpaying as being caught is unlikely and fines tend 
to be small in comparison to what can be gained from tax evasion. The fact that taxes are 
paid nevertheless can be explained with tradition and especially with trust. Feld and Frey 
(2002) show for Switzerland that the more far-reaching political participation rights are, the 
higher tax morale is.  17 
 
Another aspect brought out in this discussion is that voters are more likely to accept a 
policy they are familiar with, as is the case with regulation, in contrast to market-based 
instruments. Dresner et  al. (2006) point out that “familiarity breeds affection: those being 
controlled regard it as ‘tolerable’ while an alternative approach might not be seen as such”. A 
position also supported by Brännlund and Persson (2010) who find, that people generally 
dislike the word “tax” and are more willing to accept a policy that even though actually being 
a tax is labeled differently. That terminology itself may have a considerable influence on 
acceptance is also shown in Clinch and Dunne (2006) who propose to relabel taxes as 
charges, since ‘tax’ is considered a ‘bad’ word.  
Kirchgässner and Schneider (2002) argue that voting out of self-interest is possibly a 
major obstacle to any kind of environmental policy. An interesting data set that allows the 
analysis of individual characteristics of voting behavior was gathered in Switzerland in the 
year 2000, when Swiss citizens voted on three proposals for taxes on fossil energy. 
Thalmann (2004) analyzed the data and found that political affinity and education played a 
role in voter behavior. Both citizens with an affinity to green and left-of-center parties and 
citizens with higher education had higher rates of participation in the vote and also of 
approval of the tax proposals, whereas income – ceteris paribus - did not significantly 
influence voting behavior.  
In another analysis of the votes on the three Swiss proposals, Bornstein and Lanz (2008) 
found that socially accepted norms and ideology do play a role in the referendum outcome 
and that price and/or income effects are not the only factors taken into account by voters.   
From the values of social discount rates given in the literature it appears that voters care 
more about the here and now than about the future: In an overview of relevant papers, 
van der Bergh (2009) reports values varying between 3 and 6%, where any social discount 
rate above 0% implies that a higher weight (importance) is given to early generations than to 
generations in the distant future (see Howarth (2001) for a discussion). Layton and Levine 
(2003) calculate a public discount rate of nearly 1%. Even though there is an ongoing dispute 
in the literature about the use, morality and size of social discount rates, especially in view of 
the costs of fighting climate change (see Ackerman et  al. (2009)), there is a widespread 
tendency to assume that voters at least to some extent attach more value to the present then 
to some unknown future. Most interestingly, Halla et  al. (2008) find that parents worry 
significantly more about CO2 emissions than citizens without children, which is another 
argument in favor of a non-zero inter-temporal discount rate.  
Summing up our discussion, we find three main issues that may explain why voters do not 
explicitly vote for the environment: firstly, the provision of the public good ‘environment’ 
allows free-rider behavior, secondly, the time delay between costs and benefits of 
environmental policies (especially CO2 emission reduction) is difficult to explain and non-zero 
social discount rates diminish the future’s importance and finally, other more urgent issues, 
like unemployment or security, are of higher priority than less tangible environmental issues.  
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3.2 The Politicians 
 
We now turn to analyzing the behavior of politicians and their positions concerning the 
introduction of market-based instruments. The main questions that need to be discussed are 
whether politicians are intrinsically motivated to engage in environmental policy, and whether 
they favor market-based instruments or command-and-control mechanisms.  
The standard political economy approach assumes self-interested behavior of utility-
maximizing politicians, where utility is gained by being re-elected (see Mueller (2003)) and by 
reaching certain ideological policy goals. If re-election is the maximizing condition, a politician 
will promote a certain policy only if the median voter demands it and is willing to pay for it 
(see Maux (2009) for a formal discussion of the median-voter model and Böhringer and Vogt 
(2004) for an empirical discussion of how the national median voter’s willingness to pay 
determined the outcome of the Kyoto negotiations). Weck-Hannemann (2008) argues that 
politicians are intrinsically motivated to implement instruments that are in line with their 
political ideology and increase their power or their personal income. Whether or not they can 
follow their own inclinations or have to comply with the median voter’s demands depends on 
how stringent the re-election constraint is. Then again, List and Sturm (2006) argue that the 
re-election constraint may be valid only for major political topics like overall government 
spending or income distribution, it may be less important for secondary issues like 
environmental policy: a view that is also supported by Franzese (2002).  
The question whether or not the re-election criterion is an important factor in a politician’s 
decision to engage in environmental policy can also be discussed in connection with the 
partisan hypothesis, to the effect that the re-election constraint is stringent only in election 
times, but does not influence the politician’s decisions throughout his term (see Tellier (2006) 
and Franzese (2002) for a review of empirical studies of partisan cycles and Maux (2009) for 
a formal approach to the partisan model).  
According to Frey and Schneider (1978) the governing party that aims to stay in power will 
seek to please the median voter only if its self-perceived re-election chances are low. If its 
self-perceived re-election probability is high, it will undertake policies in line with its ideology. 
As we stated above, politicians want to be re-elected, to have power and to receive benefits. 
What does that mean for a politician’s intrinsic motivation to pursue environmental policies? 
Firstly, as our discussion in section 3.1 showed, voters value the environment but do not 
have complete information about environmental issues, their importance and the toolkit of 
instruments that can be used. They also fear being overly burdened financially. Furthermore, 
following the argumentation of List and Sturm (2006) environmental issues may be of only 
secondary interest to the median voter, but if secondary issues do not influence the median 
voter’s election decision, there may be voters who attach extraordinarily high importance to 
such issues. A politician may therefore be inclined to pursue this secondary policy in order to 
receive additional votes. Furthermore List and Sturm (2006), who empirically analyzed U.S 
governors’ public spending and environmental policies, found that “in states with a large 19 
 
group of green voters […] governors advance less environmentally friendly policies once they 
face a binding term limit.” They also “[…] observe the opposite pattern in states with a small 
environmental constituency, where governors advance much greener policies once they can 
no longer be re-elected.” They interpreted their results as support for their theory that 
politicians reverse policies they have pursued only to attract additional voters, and conclude 
that secondary policy issues like environmental policies are strongly influenced by elections.  
Weck-Hannemann (2008) also points out that politicians are not completely tied to the 
median voter’s demands, because rational voters acquire political information only up to the 
point where the marginal cost of acquiring additional information equals the marginal 
benefits. As the single voter’s influence on an election outcome is marginal, this benefit from 
acquiring information is marginal, too. In consequence, with uninformed voters, politicians 
can pursue their own goals. This lack of information on the voters’ side offers scope for 
interest groups to influence politicians according to their own motives (see section 3.3).  
We find that politicians may be intrinsically motivated to implement environmental policies 
especially to improve their chances of re-election. From this the second question arises: if 
politicians pursue environmental policies, do they favor market-based instruments or 
command-and-control measures? There are four arguments in favor of market-based 
instruments. Firstly, we can reasonably assume that politicians are better informed about 
market-based instruments and their comparative efficiency advantages over command-and-
control measures.  
Secondly, market based instruments like taxes increase – compared to command-and-
control measures like standards - the government’s revenue, which provides leeway for 
reducing other taxes or for financing other projects that may be of primary interest to the 
median voter and thus increase the chances of re-election.  
Thirdly, environmental taxes or permit systems may be easier to explain to the public than 
other taxes because they can be labeled as punishment for polluters (see Kirchgässner and 
Schneider (2002)). And finally, as Anthoff and Hahn (2010) point out, politicians may favor 
market-based instruments, as they have some control over defining winners and losers from 
a specific policy. 
We now turn to arguments in favor of command-and-control measures: Firstly, a utility-
maximizing politician is also likely to pursue a policy that leads to immediate and noticeable 
utility gains for the median voter, while its costs are as invisible as possible. In contrast to 
market-based instruments, command-and-control mechanisms have the advantage of less 
visible costs (see Oates and Portney (2003) and Weck-Hannemann (2008)), and can 
probably be supplied at lower cost (see Stavins et al. (1997)).  
Secondly, as discussed above, politicians will favor policies that improve their re-election 
prospects, so they will try to please either voters or interest groups. Both of these (see 
sections 3.1 and 3.3) may favor command-and-control measures. Voters are more familiar 
with these instruments and interest groups have more leeway to pursue their own interest 
under a command-and-control regime (see Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann (2002)).  20 
 
Thirdly, as Stavins et  al. (1997) and Oates and Portney (2003) argue, command-and-
control measures may serve as market-entry barriers to new firms – standards for new 
products tend to be more stringent than for existing ones – and are therefore favored by 
existing firms and by politicians who want to protect these firms.  
In conclusion, after arguing that a self-interested politician may not be intrinsically 
motivated to promote market-based instruments over command-and-control measures, but 
reacts to the other agents’ interests, the question arises whether such a policy - if put in 
place - will be carried out efficiently. From our discussion so far, it follows that the design of a 
specific policy is strongly influenced by interest groups whose motivations we will discuss in 
the following.  
 
 
3.3 The affected producers and interest groups 
 
To assess the influence of interest groups on the outcome of negotiations about the 
introduction of market-based instruments in environmental policy, two aspects of lobbying 
power need to be considered: firstly, the lobbyists’ strategy can aim at preventing an 
instrument’s use, and secondly, if prevention is impossible, they can alter a policy’s design 
according to their individual preferences. Lehmann (2003) goes on to distinguish between 
four categories of lobbyists which differ according to the services they offer:  
-  service functions, i.e. the provision of specific (and often exclusive) services for their 
members 
-  lobbying functions, i.e. attempts to influence decision-making processes from outside 
-  decision-making functions, i.e. attempts to influence decisions from within 
-  implementation functions, i.e. participation in policy implementation  
The importance of organized interest groups derives from the need of detailed expert 
knowledge for reaching educated decisions in environmental policy. At the moment, more 
than 2,700 organizations and individuals are accredited as lobbyists at the European 
Parliament (accrediting is voluntary not mandatory); 53% of them are «in-house» lobbyists 
and trade associations active in lobbying. Coen (2007) defines a lobbyist as an “organisation 
or individual that seeks to influence policy, but does not seek to be elected” and points out 
“that lobbying is a familiar if not always welcome reality in western politics, and that most 
political scientist and policy-makers recognise that public and private interests have a 
legitimate and important role to play in the policy process”. That about 15,000 Commission 
and European Parliamentary officials face 20,000 lobbyists in Brussels may serve as an 
indicator showing that lobbying activities have to be considered a major influence on any 
political activity.  
We argue that producers prefer command and control measures over market–based 
instruments in environmental policy (see section 2.1 and 2.2), which may go far to explain 21 
 
their restricted use. We furthermore argue that green interest groups also favor command-
and-control measures and have a weaker position in the policy making process. In the 
following we analyze whether from these propositions the restricted use of market-based 
instruments can be explained.  
We assume that the lobbyists’ information is equally reliable; then the question arises 
which characteristics of a group will make them more successful in pursuing their individual 
goals. Firstly, producers’ lobbyists will have more financial backing than environmental 
advocacy groups. Most interestingly, the so called Green-10, composed of the ten major 
environmental advocacy groups (BirdLife International, Climate Action Network Europe, CEE 
Bankwatch Network, European Environmental Bureau, European Federation of Transport 
and Environment, Health and Environment Alliance, Friends of the Earth Europe, 
Greenpeace Europe, International Friends of Nature, and WWF European Policy Office), 
receive substantial funding from the European Commission (excluding Greenpeace which 
policy is not to accept financial support from governments, the EU or industry). The 
importance of any interest group’s budget is shown by Eising (2007). He calculates within a 
regression model encompassing data from 800 interest groups, that the probability to have 
weekly contact to the European Commission is 50 % higher if an interest group has a budget 
of 7.5 million euro compared to an interest group without a budget. 
Secondly, with environmental issues, especially pollution control and alternative 
technologies, there is a strong information asymmetry between producers’ lobbyists and 
environmental lobbyists.  
Thirdly, Oates and Portney (2003) reckon that environmental interest groups object to 
market-based instruments in environmental policy on philosophical grounds. In their line of 
thinking, permits and environmental taxes are interpreted as “rights to pollute” and are 
therefore immoral. Stavins et al. (1997) add that environmental interest groups furthermore 
argue that the possible damages from pollution are difficult or impossible to quantify and 
monetize, which prevents the calculation of an accurate tax rate.  
Fourthly, as Becker (1983) famously described in his “Theory of Competition Among 
Pressure Groups for Political Influence”, group size matters: the smaller the group the more 
effectively it can lobby, which is why business lobbying tends to be more effective than 
lobbying for consumers (see also Brandt and Svendsen (2002), Markussen et al. (1998), 
Svendsen (2002)). Public interest groups (like environmental groups) are also relatively weak 
due to group size.  
The relative strength of an interest group furthermore depends on a number of factors, 
such as policy makers’ preferences and the cost/benefit ratio of the proposed regulation (see 
Brandt and Svendsen (2003). Anger et al. (2008) illustrate this in the context of the EU-ETS: 
the EU-ETS sectors which were represented by more powerful interest groups realized two 
positive outcomes: firstly, they got a preferential allocation of allowances in comparison to 
other EU-ETS sectors, and secondly, they succeeded in lowering the overall abatement 
burden within the EU-ETS, whereby abatement burden was imposed on non EU-ETS sectors 22 
 
and overall economic efficiency was reduced. Concerning the position of green interest 
groups, Lai (2008) argues that they prefer grandfathering of permits to auctioning and to 
emission taxes. He formulates a two-stage model where in the first stage the type of policy is 
determined and in the second stage the emission cap is set and shows that grandfathering 
increases the environmental policy groups political influence and minimizes the emission cap 
(see also Oates and Portney (2003)). 
In yet another example Anger et  al. (2006) study the effects of a revenue-neutral tax 
reform which links ecological taxes with reductions in labor costs. Using the German 
Ecological Tax Reform database, they find substantial effects of lobbying, especially for 
sectors with a highly inelastic energy use. From an efficiency point of view, the highest taxes 
should be imposed on these sectors; as this is known ex-ante, these sectors also have the 
highest incentive to lobby for substantially reduced taxes, which may well result in practice. 
Furthermore they show that interest groups’ effectiveness also depends on market 
concentration and energy demand elasticities. 
In an attempt to show how this resistance to environmental taxes could be overcome, Aidt 
(2010) compares different refunding mechanisms (income-tax cuts, extra public spending 
and tax-burden compensation to polluters) and shows that by “lobbying for a refunding rule 
that pleases voters, the interest group can reduce the ‘‘price’’ of buying a reduction in the 
green tax. In cases where the tax revenue can be used to compensate the interest group’s 
members, this benefit must be sufficiently large to outweigh the value of the foregone tax 
burden compensation. In cases where the tax revenue cannot be refunded to polluters, the 
interest group has no direct stake in the refunding rule and will, therefore, support the rule 
that voters prefer.” And Svendsen et al. (2001) argue that “in heterogeneous sectors the tax 
revenue is difficult to refund in a politically acceptable way. Energy-intensive firms will lose 
from taxation even with a full refund, and are able to protest quickly and with success.” 
We see that lobbyists of industrial and business interest groups are relatively better 
equipped to influence policy making from an early stage on. The specific information and 
expertise of lobbyists is a crucial factor in policy-making which strengthens the relationship 
between administrators and lobbyists. On the other hand environmental lobbyists, suffer from 
group size and fewer financial resources which in reality can even result in a situation in 
which the lobbyists are paid by the very organization they lobby. Gullberg (2008) furthermore 
shows that lobbying behavior in the European Union significantly differs between traditional 
and green interest groups. Traditional interest groups lobby bureaucrats (in the European 
context, the European Commission) while green interest group lobby the European 
Parliament. From this we derive that traditional interest groups are more involved in early 
stages of policy making than green interest groups and may therefore better influence the 
evolution of a policy. Taking the EU-ETS as example, Markussen and Svendsen (2005) 
analyzed whether the final design of the EU-ETS can be explained by potential industry 
winner or loser involved in the early stages of the policy making process. Their answer is 
ambiguous because on the one hand industries main objective to install a voluntary system 23 
 
was not realized. But on the other hand, lobbying lead to a policy design that benefited 
industry more than any other policy design that could have been realized.  
 
 
3.4 The public bureaucracy 
 
We now turn to analyzing the role of the administrative level of the political system. 
Administrators necessarily play an important role in the preparation and early implementation 
of environmental policy measures. According to Niskanen’s famous model of bureaucracy 
(see Niskanen (1971), the leader of any public administration unit seeks to maximize his 
unit’s budget, increase the number of his employees, and hence increase his power and 
importance (see Chang and Turnbull (2002) who provide empirical support for this notion). In 
contrast to politicians administrators are also not bound by re-election constraints. If this 
holds true for authority whether or not it is engaged in environmental policy, the result of 
budget-maximizing is that environmental administrations are intrinsically motivated to 
implement environmental policy measures which require the most administrative controls as 
well as exhibiting the highest costs (see Mueller (2003)). We can also assume that most 
members of ‘green’ public authorities identify themselves with the goals of their authority and 
are highly motivated. But being motivated need not necessarily lead to favoring cost-efficient 
policy making. Especially with environmental policy that is largely tied to incentives that need 
to be given to the regulated party, the inefficiency aspect of command-and-control 
mechanisms also comes from the simple fact that administrators are not there to formulate or 
provide incentives or to encourage and reward the regulated ones, not to speak of any 
innovation beyond compliance with given requirements, as Rondinelli and Berry (2000) point 
out.  
When it comes to assessing whether public authorities are in favor of command-and- 
control instruments over market-based instruments or vice versa, given budget-maximizing 
behavior, several factors need to be considered: firstly, command-and-control mechanisms 
exhibit high costs, since monitoring them is labor-intensive; secondly, with command-and-
control mechanisms the authority has an information advantage that mainly derives from 
expert knowledge within the authority compared to the government; thirdly, the authority 
simply knows what to do, which may not be the case with a new instrument; and fourthly, the 
public authority is needed for command-and-control mechanisms, but may be superfluous if, 
say, a command-and-control mechanism is replaced by an environmental tax, or this may at 
least require a great degree of flexibility within the authority (see Schneider and Volkert 
(1999) and Stavins (2003b) for a discussion).  
Instead of continuously monitoring a large number of facilities, the use of taxes or 
tradeable permits reduces the information needs of the public authority or makes the 
information completely superfluous in cases in which the relevant powers are taken away 24 
 
from the authority completely. Obviously, as information acquisition is resource-consuming, 
this is not necessarily in the interest of the authority (see Stavins et al. (1997)).  
Studies about the administrative costs of market-based and command-and-control 
instruments are scarce. Betz (2008) estimates the start-up costs of the EU-ETS for Germany 
at about 7.5 million € and the recurrent costs at about 7 million € p.a. In Germany nearly 
1,900 emitters take part in the EU-ETS. For Austria’s 200 emitters, the Austrian Federal 
Audit Commission calculated the costs of the EU-ETS for the public administration at 2 
million € in 2007. Comparing these figures, especially when they are prepared by public 
officials, is difficult if not impossible (see e.g. McCann et  al. (2005) for an analysis of 
transaction cost measurement systems).  
To the authors’ knowledge, there is no literature comparing the transaction costs of different 
environmental policy instruments in Europe. In a literature review for the US, Anthoff and 
Hahn (2010) compare literature values of the costs of different environmental instruments, 
and report “[…] the range of potential cost savings is large. Most of the studies predict cost 
savings above 40 per cent by moving from marketable permits from an existing command-
and-control approach, and some predict cost savings above 90 per cent”. Keohane (2006) 
studies the US system of tradeable pollution permits for sulfur dioxide emitted by electric 
power plants during the first trading period from 1995 to 1999. He finds that the trading 
system led to estimated annual cost savings of 150 mio. $ in comparison to a uniform 
performance standard which would have achieved the same abatement. This figure 
corresponds to a 17% cost reduction. From the experiences made we draw the conclusion 
that the theoretic notion that with market-based instruments efficient environmental policy 
can be achieved with lower costs.  
In the light of section 3.3 we conclude that the affected producers and the public authorities 
are the two groups with the strongest reasons to favor command-and-control policies. Also, 




4. Concluding remarks 
 
In recent years the use of market-based instruments in environmental policy has steadily 
increased; most notably the EU-ETS brought a major shift in the way environmental policy is 
implemented and perceived. But still, the efficiency of the instruments in use is questionable, 
as their design seems to be strongly influenced by the economic agents’ different interests. 
We used Public Choice theory to differentiate between five economic agents, voters, 
politicians, producers, interest groups and administrators, and considered the intrinsic 
motivation of each group in turn to find answers to the question we posed in the title of our 
paper, “Why does environmental policy in representative democracies tend to be 
inadequate?” Summarizing our public choice analysis, we draw the following conclusions: 
(1) While, in the past, command-and-control instruments successfully reduced tangible 
environmental pollution (mostly in local areas) and improved the overall environmental 
quality in Western democracies, the more threatening but much less tangible global 
pollution arising from CO2 emissions obviously cannot be controlled with command-
and-control measures. Furthermore, economic theory shows the superiority of market-
based instruments over command-and-control measures in terms of efficiency. Still, 
experience so far with market-based instruments is sobering, as regards both their 
frequency of use and their design and effects. The EU-ETS suffers from conceptual 
weaknesses, as not only was grandfathering chosen as the allocation method instead 
of auctions, but it also seems to have led to an over-allocation of tradeable permits 
and to windfall profits. The environmental taxes imposed in several European 
countries on fossil energy and CO2 emissions are used more to finance public 
spending and less as instruments in fighting climate change or reducing environmental 
pollution. 
(2) On the other hand, both political rhetoric and public discussion point strongly to the 
need to fight climate change, and to the economic superiority of tradeable permit 
systems or taxes over command-and-control instruments. And the general public, the 
voters, attach great importance to environmental quality: an empirical fact repeatedly 
verified in the studies we reviewed. The growing body of literature about what 
influences happiness also shows the high positive correlation between individual 
happiness and environmental quality. In addition the more tangible willingness-to-pay 
studies confirm these findings and show that parents have a higher willingness to pay 
for CO2 emission reductions, which may be an argument in favor of a non-zero social 
discount rate. The value that voters place on the environment surely is high, but we 
also mentioned that in terms of everyday life, in which one’s job, income and security 
situation have more weight than less tangible aspects, like CO2 emissions, people’s 
environmental morale or intrinsic motivation may not be high enough for them to 
actively vote for the environment. Furthermore, the costs of fighting climate change 26 
 
are imposed on today’s voters immediately, while it is future generations that will 
benefit from this effort. While, as described above, altruistic behavior can surely be 
ascribed to part of society, it may be less prevalent for environmental policy measures 
in society as a whole.  
(3) With a look at the affected producers and interest groups, we conclude that, all in all, 
traditional (industrial) interest groups have every advantage over green interest 
groups: their group’s size is in their favor and their financial backing is considerable. 
Both aspects work against the green interest groups, who suffer from the simple fact 
that they represent the general public, so group size is an issue and financing 
themselves is much more difficult (not at least due to free-rider behavior).  
(4) Considering the public administration, we conclude that administrators have budget-
maximizing behavior which makes command-and-control measures more attractive to 
them, because monitoring these is resource-intensive. Furthermore, they are in favor 
of command-and-control instruments over market-based instruments for several other 
reasons: command-and-control mechanisms exhibit high costs, there they have an 
information advantage because they profit from expert knowledge within the authority 
compared to the government, the authority simply knows what to do, which may not be 
the case with a new instrument, and the public authority is needed for command-and-
control mechanisms, but may be much less needed if a command-and-control 
mechanism is replaced by  market-based instruments such as an environmental tax. 
We conclude that the regulated industries and the public authorities are the two 
groups who have the strongest reasons to favor command-and-control policies. Also, 
both parties have the political power and resources to influence the design of 
environmental policy, which we consider the main answer to the question posed in the 
title of our paper.  
 
What can we derive from our analysis? Firstly, to increase the importance and influence of 
voters/taxpayers one could push the idea of giving voters more rights, such as the 
introduction of a referendum or the right to an initiative. Now voters can express their 
preferences on single issues (like environmental ones) and force the government to 
undertake certain ecological measures. It is important that power to set the agenda is then 
shifted from the government or bureaucracy to the voters, too. As we see in Switzerland, the 
institution of the referendum or direct democracy has worked quite effectively. Secondly, as 
we show in our discussion of voters’ motives and interests, a persisting information 
asymmetry remains a major obstacle in environmental policy. Ongoing efforts made 
especially on the European level, such as ‘green labels’ for food and non-food products, may 
help voters to internalize environmental behavior and thus increase the pressure on 
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